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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(c), confer jurisdiction upon this court to hear this appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No, 1: Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance, relative to the purchase
of Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property.
Issue No. 2: It was judicial error, and/or an abuse of the discretion, for the trial court to not
allow Petitioner/Appellant to deduct the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona fide
third party purchasers.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

The issues attendant to the parties' divorce were tried by the Honorable Thomas L.

Kay, Second Judicial District Court Judge on October 1 and 2, 2002. Petitioner/Appellant's then
counsel prepared proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Respondent/Appellee filed
an objection to the proposed documents. Subsequent to the objection, on or about November 15,
2002, Respondent/Appellee filed a " Withdrawal of Objection to Form of Findings and Decree" in
which it was represented to the trial court that
...counsel for the parties have resolved the issues concerning the form of the
documents and counsel for Respondent has approved as to form the acceptable
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce. Respondent
prays that the documents which have been approved as to form be signed and entered
by the Court as soon as received.
See, Withdrawal of Objection, page 138 of the Second District Court file provided as the Record on
Appeal to this Court.
2.

On or about November 25, 2005, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and

Decree of Divorce were signed by the Honorable Thomas L, Kay, Second Judicial District Court
-1-

Judge and entered by the Second Judicial District Court Clerk. Within the Decree of Divorce, the
Petitioner/Appellant was
awarded a right of first refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California
properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California property,
the petitioner shall receive written notice of the acceptance of the offer and shall have
thirty (30) days from the receipt of said notice to provide written noticeof his election
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. If petitioner
exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay respondent the amount she would
receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the
time he exercise his right of first refusal.
See, Decree of Divorce, page 4, paragraph 15, page 170 of the Second District Court file provided
as the Record on Appeal to this Court.
3.

Petitioner/Appellant was also ordered to pay Respondent/Appellee alimony in the sum

of $1,000.00 per month.
until terminated by the Court or upon the remarriage or cohabitation of the
respondent, the death of either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which,
under Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
See, Decree of Divorce, page 6, paragraph 23, page 172 of the Second District Court file provided
as the Record on Appeal to this Court.
4.

The parties owned several parcels of real property, which were found to be joint

marital property and the Decree of Divorce ordered to be sold, subject to Petitioner/Appellant's right
of first refusal. Of those properties, only two are the subject of this Appeal and are described as
follows:
a.

land and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba

County, California, herein after referred to as the "Personal Residence; and"
b.

land and associated improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba

County, California, herein after referred to as the "Lake Property."
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5.

In June 2003, Petitioner/Appellant discovered, through a court pleading filed by

Respondent/Appellee, that Respondent/Appellee had received and accepted a bona fide "Purchase
Agreement" offer from a third party. Respondent/Appellee failed to provide Petitioner/Appellant
notice that Respondent/Appellee had accepted a bona fide offer as required by the Decree of Divorce
entered in this matter. See, Decree of Divorce, page 4, paragraph 15, Page 170 of the Record on
Appeal as provided by the Second Judicial District Court.
6.

Petitioner/Appellant provided a written offer to Respondent/Appellee (Trial

Transcript, page 27, lines 21-23) which included his offer to purchase Respondent/Appellee's interest
in the property for $39,286.74 and tendered payment in that amount. This amount was designated
by Petitioner/Appellant as a "good faith" estimate of the actual amount Respondent/Appellee would
receive from the sale of the property pursuant to the terms "Purchase Agreement" offer
Respondent/Appellee had received and accepted. Petitioner/Appellant included a copy of his
calculations in the form of an "Estimated Settlement Statement,"as part of the written offer and tender
of payment. Petitioner/Appellant also provided Respondent/Appellee with a quit claim deed for the
subject property. Petitioner/Appellant's offer was not, and could not have been, an exercise of his
"right of first refusal," as Respondent/Appellee had failed and refused to notify Petitioner/Appellant
of her acceptance of a bona fide offer.
7.

Petitioner/Appellant's tender of payment was his offer to purchase the property, with

the sole condition being transfer of the title to the property upon negotiation of the funds tendered
for payment of the real property. Petitioner/Appellant's offer to purchase the real property was not
subject to the same terms as the offer Respondent/Appellee had received from a third party.
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8.

Respondent/Appellee negotiated that $39,286.74 payment (Trial Transcript, page 102,

lines 6 and 7), which consisted of two money orders and a cashier's check.

However,

Respondent/Appellee did not return the "quit claim deed" that was to be signed, notarized and
returned to Petitioner/Appellant upon receipt of tender of the purchase price offered by
Petitioner/Appellant.

Instead, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner/Appellant that, despite

receiving the "sales agreement" from Petitioner/Appellant and negotiating the payments, those monies
were insufficient for her to return the signed and notarized quit claim deed for the Personal
Residence.
9.

Upon receipt of Respondent/Appellee's notice of alleged insufficiency in the monies

she received, Petitioner/Appellant immediately notified Respondent/Appellee that he would not agree
to any additional conditions on the "sale" of the Personal Residence. Petitioner/Appellant also
requested that Respondent/Appellee

immediately return the $39,286.74 he had paid

Respondent/ Appellee for the sole purpose of payment of the "sales" price for the Personal Residence.
10.

Respondent/Appellee refused to refund those monies or abide by the terms of the sale

proposed by Petitioner/Appellant. Instead, Respondent/Appellee prepared a completely new quit
claim deed, using what appeared to be an Oklahoma quit claim deed form, which she had signed and
notarized. (Trial Transcript, page 32, lines 15-17.) Petitioner/Appellant filed the "quit claim deed"
in the County of Yuma, State of California and ownership of the Personal Residence was transferred
to Petitioner/Appellant.
11.

Also, in June 2003. Petitioner/Appellant discovered, through Respondent/Appellee's

Agent, that Respondent/Appellee had received, and intended to accept, a bona fide "Purchase
Agreement" offer from a third party for the "Lake Property."
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12.

Petitioner/Appellant mailed Respondent/Appellee a $15,044.26 payment, which was

specifically designated as the first portion of Respondent/Appellee's one-half share of the estimated
net sales proceeds of the Lake Property. Petitioner/Appellant also informed Respondent/Appellee
that the balance would be paid within thirty (30) days, as set forth in paragraph 15 of the Decree of
Divorce. Petitioner/Appellant did calculate the net proceeds that should be paid to
Respondent/Appellee on the same terms as the bona fide "Purchase Agreement" offer
Respondent/Appellee had received from a third party.
13.

Once again, being fully informed of the purpose of those funds, Respondent/Appellee

deposited those funds into her bank or otherwise negotiated the payment.

Again,

Respondent/Appellee failed and refused to return the quit claim deed for the "Lake Property."
Instead, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner that she had not accepted the bona fide "Purchase
Agreement" offer from the third party. Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner/Appellant that she
would neither return the monies Petitioner/Appellant had paid for the sole purpose of purchasing the
Lake Property. Instead, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner that those monies would first be
used to pay the additional $1,500.00 Respondent/Appellee believed was still owed to her for her
interest in the Personal Residence. In addition, Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner/Appellant
that she was keeping $6,000.00 of those monies to pay future alimony payments.
Respondent/Appellee informed Petitioner that remaining $7,500.00 would either be returned to
Petitioner/Appellant or that Respondent/Appellee would apply that only the remaining $7,500.00 the
amount Respondent/Appellee believed would be owed to her if Petitioner/Appellant chose to
"purchase" the Lake Property. (Trial Transcript, page 49, lines 13 -25, and page 50, lines 1 -18.)
Respondent/Appellee refiised to allow Petitioner/Appellant to purchase the Lake Property under the
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same terms as the bona fide offer she had previously received and expected Petitioner/Appellant to
pay a higher price for the Lake Property.
14.

Petitioner/Appellant rejected Respondent/Appellee's counteroffer for the Lake

Property and, once again, demanded the return of the entire $15,044.26 he had tendered to
Respondent/Appellee for the sole purpose of purchasing the Lake Property. Respondent/Appellee
refused to return the monies to Petitioner/Appellant.
15.

There was no further communication between the parties regarding either of the real

properties until Respondent/Appellee filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause in the Second
District Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah in April of 2004. The trial court's decision
after an evidentiary hearing on November 10, 2004, as set forth in the "Order After Hearing," signed
and filed by the Court on November 25, 2004.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1. There is no dispute that Respondent/Appellee was provided a copy of
Petitioner/Appellant's "sales" proposal for both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property. There
is no dispute that Respondent/Appellee negotiated the payment she received, had the use and benefit
of those monies to the detriment of Petitioner/Appellant and refused to return those monies when
Petitioner/Appellant refused to accept her modified terms of "sale." There is no dispute that
Respondent/Appellee did provide a signed and notarized quit claim deed for the Personal Residence
rather than return the purchase price to Petitioner/Appellant.

There is no dispute that

Respondent/Appellee had the use and benefit of the payment for the Lake Property, to the detriment
of Petitioner/Appellant and refused to return those monies when Petitioner/Appellant refused to
accept her counteroffer for the Lake Property. The transactions between the parties, as to both
-6-

parcels of real property, meet the longstanding "offer, acceptance and tender" requirements of any
contract transaction. Respondent/Appellee received the benefit of tender, to the detriment of
Petitioner/Appellant and the court's equitable powers do not allow the trial court to modify a
transaction simply because one of the parties has come to regret the agreement. Petitioner/ Appellant
is entitled to specific performance as to both contracts for his purchase of Respondent/Appellee's
interest in both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property.
Issue No. 2. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce are
clear as to which costs will be paid from the sales proceeds of the parties' California properties. The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are clear that if Petitioner/Appellant
exercised his right of first refusal to "purchase" the property, Petitioner/Appellant would pay
Respondent/Appellee the amount she would receive from the sale of the parcel based on the same
terms of the bona fide offer pay if the property were sold to a third party. There was no request
before the trial court by either party to modify paragraphs 15 and 17 of the Decree of Divorce. The
ruling by the trial court, that sales commissions or other estimated closing costs, could not be
deducted from the monies to be paid to Respondent/Appellee was a judicial error and/or an abuse of
judicial discretion. Petitioner/Appellant should be entitled to deduct the costs that would have been
incurred if the properties were sold to a bona fide third party purchaser prior to paying
Respondent/Appellee her one-half interest in the subject real properties.
ARGUMENT
Issue No, 1: Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance relative to the purchase
of Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in both the Personal Residence and the Lake Property.
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1.

The Utah Supreme Court, in Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), found that

there is
no principle of equity that demands all the terms of the contract must be set forth in
the written agreement. Rather, although an agreement is uncertain or incomplete in
some respects, its specific enforcement may nevertheless be decreed where the
uncertainty relates to matters which the law makes certain or complete by
presumption, rule or custom and usage. Where there is no agreement concerning the
terms of payment this Court will alleviate the uncertainty of this aspect of the contract
by requiring full payment at the time of the tender of the conveyance.
2.

The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of the rule that "to be

enforceable a contract must be sufficiently definite in its terms that the parties know what is required
of them." Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491; and Cf Ansorge v. Kane, 244 N. Y.
395, 155 N.E 683. However, in Kierk v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 1139 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court quantified that position by finding that
But like all rules, which are necessarily stated in generality, it is only applicable in the
proper circumstances, where the justice of the case requires: as a shield to protect a
party from an injustice, and not as a weapon with which to perpetrate an injustice.
3.

Under the evidence and the particular facts of this case, as well as in Kierk, there is

no dispute that Petitioner/Appellant agreed to purchase Respondent/Appellee's interest in the
Personal Residence for the price of the $39,286.74, Respondent/Appellee provide a quit claim to the
property and Petitioner/Appellant should be entitled to specific performance as to the Personal
Residence or the return of the $39,286.74 he paid to Respondent/Appellee for the sole purpose of
purchasing her one-half interest in the Personal Residence.
4.

Kierk is also applicable as to specific performance of the purchase of

Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in the Lake Property. Again, Petitioner/Appellant provided
Respondent/Appellee a written offer, to include partial payment, with the remainder to be paid within
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30 days

Respondent/Appellee negotiated the payment and then presented a counteroffer to

Petitioner. Again, the Utah Supreme Court found that if only the parties reserve only
the "terms" of payment, they should be obliged to act in good faith in keeping their
promises. It would seem inequitable and unjust to permit a seller to simply refuse
unreasoningly to perform and seek specious excuses in an attempt to justify his
refusal
But neither party should be permitted to use the reservation of "terms" to
get more than they had promised: the plaintiff to get more land, or the defendants to
get more money, nor either to renege on the bargain...
5.

Respondent/Appellee's acceptance was "positive and unambiguous" as required by

the Utah Supreme Court in RJ.Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194 (Utah 1952).
Respondent/Appellee's actions in negotiating the payment, refusal to return the payment and signing
the quit claim deed before a notary and then providing that quit claim deed did not change, add to,
or qualify the terms of the offer by Petitioner/Appellant and the contract between the parties for the
"sale" of the California properties is complete and "its binding force cannot be affected by subsequent
communications unless they amount to a mutual agreement to rescind." IdL
6.

In this instant dispute, all of Petitioner/Appellant's terms were set forth in the written

proposal that was sent to Respondent/Appellee and Petitioner/Appellant tendered his "full payment"
and requested "tender of the conveyance." Respondent/Appellee accepted those terms as evidenced
by her negotiation

of the tender representing Petitioner/Appellant's

purchase

price

Petitioner/Appellant believes that copies of the relevant documents (i.e., purchase agreement, checks
and quit claim deed) were entered into the record and are contained in the sealed exhibit envelope in
the Second District Court filed designated as the Record on Appeal. Petitioner/Appellant was
informed that sealed envelope cannot be opened absent a court order and Petitioner/Appellant is
unable to provide copies of those documents at this time.
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7.

In this instant dispute, all of Petitioner/Appellant's terms were set forth in the written

proposal that was sent to Respondent/Appellee and Petitioner/Appellant tendered his "full payment"
and requested "tender of the conveyance." Respondent/Appellee had the use and benefit of that
tender, to the detriment of Petitioner/Appellant. Respondent/Appellee cannot hold the quit claim
deed hostage to obtain more money and Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance as
to the transfer of interest in the Personal Residence. Respondent/Appellee cannot hold the quit claim
deed hostage to obtain more money and Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to specific performance as
to the transfer of Respondent/Appellee's interest in the Personal Residence.
8.

Similarly, Respondent/Appellee had the use and benefit, to the detriment of

Petitioner/Appellant, of the monies paid by Petitioner/Appellant, purchase and transfer of
Respondent/Appellee's interest in the Lake Property. Again, Petitioner/Appellant is entitled to
specific performance as to the transfer of Respondent/Appellee's interest in the Lake Property.
Issue No. 2. It was judicial error and/or an abuse of the discretion for the trial court not to
allow Petitioner/Appellant to deduct the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona fide
third party purchasers. The Decree of Divorce is clear as to which costs of sale will be deducted from
the sales proceeds prior to the 50/50 division of the net proceeds between the parties.
It is not the province of the court to alter a contract by construction or to make a new
contract for the parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one which they
have made for themselves, without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot
supply material stipulations or read into the contract words which it does not contain.
Jensen v. Kidman, 85 Utah 27 (Utah 1934)
In the interest of promoting stability in titles, modifications in a decree of divorce
affecting the "disposition of real property are to be granted only upon a showing of
compelling reasons arising from a substantial and material change in circumstances."
Williams v. Shearwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984) (property divisions should
be modified only with great reluctance and upon compelling reasons).
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[E]quity should not be used as a lever to realign rights and privileges 'Voluntarily
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain made." Lea v.
Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) (quoting Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248,
1250-51 (Utah 1980)). Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57 (1990)
9.

The trial court does maintain continuing jurisdiction over divorce matters and has the

authority to modify a decree of divorce. However, Rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states that "... proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by filing a petition to
modify the divorce decree." [emphasis added.] Petitioner/Appellant had filed a petition to modify as
to the issue of alimony, but Respondent/Appellee did not file a counter-petition requesting
modification of paragraphs 15 and 17 of the Decree of Divorce. Respondent/Appellee filed her
Motion for Order to Show Cause, on March 31, 2004 and, at that time, Rule 106 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure included a provision that "No request to modify a decree shall be raised by an
order to show cause," which was not deleted until April 1, 2004."
10.

If this Court finds that Petitioner/Appellant is not entitled to specific performance as

to his purchase of Respondent/Appellee's one-half interest in the subject real properties,
Petitioner/Appellant must be allowed to deduct the costs of sale as set forth in the parties' Decree of
Divorce. Respondent/Appellee has shown no substantial change of circumstances as to terms of sale
set forth in the parties' Decree of Divorce. Respondent/Appellee is not entitled to additional monies
simply because she now regrets the bargain she made.
CONCLUSION
It was judicial error and/or an abuse ofjudicial discretion for the trial court to refuse to order
Respondent/Appellee to either return the monies Petitioner/Appellant paid to Respondent/Appellee
for the subject real properties or order Respondent/Appellee to transfer her interest in the subject
properties to Petitioner/Appellant. In the alternative, the trial court should have enforced the terms
-11-

of sale as set forth in the parties' Decree of Divorce and allowed Petitioner/Appellant to pay
Respondent/ Appellee only the amount she would have received if the real properties had been sold
to a bona fide third party purchaser.

The ruling of trial court should be reversed and

Respondent/Appellee should be ordered to either return all monies she was paid for the real property
to Petitioner/Appellant or provide the quit claim deeds to the properties absent any additional
conditions.
DATED this Z~Z_ day of

mqv^x

2006.

TERRY R. SPENCER
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of March, 2006,1 caused two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid to:
JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211
Patterson, Barking & Larkin
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2006.

n,h
Terry R. Spence
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 of
PATTERSON, BARKING, THOMPSON & LARKIN
Attorney for Respondent
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
Telephone: (801) 394-7704

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

WESLEY O. BAYLES,

WITHDRAWAL OF OBJECTION
TO FORM OF FINDINGS AND DECREE

Petitioner,
vs,

Civil No. 004702059DA

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

Judge: Thomas L. Kay

Respondent,

Commissioner: David L. Dillon

COMES NOW Respondent, LINDA CARYL BAYLES, by and through
her

attorney

of record,

and withdraws

her Objection

to Form

previously filed herein, on the basis that counsel for the parties
have resolved the issues concerning the form of the documents
and

counsel

for

Respondent

has

approved

as

to

form

the

acceptable Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree
of Divorce.

Respondent prays that the documents which have been

approved as to form be signed and entered by the Court as soon as
received.

.
Dated this

IH

/ithdrawai of Objection \

day of

//(L^^

2002.

NG

or Respondent

' BAYLES, LINDA CAR

c D

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the / ^
day of November, 2002,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Withdrawal
of Objection to Eric N. Weeks, Attorney for Petitioner, at 1050
Walker Terrace, 19 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
postage prepaid.

JUDY
Attorn

FILED
NOV 2 5 2002
E.

NORDELL WEEKS (3412)
Layton District Court

ERIC N. WEEKS (7340)
WEEKS LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Petitioner
1050 Walker Terrace
19 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2800
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,
I
Petitioner

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 004702059 DA
LINDA CARYL BAYLES,
Judge Thomas L. Kay
Respondent

|

The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a
trial on this matter held on October 1 through October 2, 2002.
The Court, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file
herein, having heard testimony and reviewed documentation and
being fully advised as to both the evidence and law pertaining
thereto, hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The petitioner is a resident of Davis County, State of
Utah, and has been for at least three (3) months immediately prior
to the filing of this action.
•INDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

nrwrrnonso

VD10820261 _

_

_nD

2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the
State of Utah or the acts complained of by the petitioner were
committed by the respondent in the State of Utah and therefore the
above-captioned Court has jurisdiction over the respondent
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended).
3 . The petitioner and respondent were married in the City
of Bountiful, State of Utah, on the 10th day of August, 1988, and
separated on or about November 28, 2000.
Grounds for Divorce
4. During the course of this marriage, differences have
arisen between the parties, which differences have now become
irreconcilable, thereby making continuation of the marriage
relationship impossible.
5. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.
Children of the Parties
6. No Children have been born as issue of this marriage
and none are expected.
7. The respondent currently has physical custody of two
minor children, the petitioner's grand nephew Andrew Vincent
Salazar and Andrew's sister BreAnna Rosa Flores Salazar, who are
not the issue of this marriage.

Custody is held pursuant to.

Salazar v. Salazar, case number 954904926 DA, filed in the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
8. The Court finds that the issue of child support was
not certified for trial and, even if it had been, there is no Utah
2

statute or case law that extends an obligation for petitioner to
pay child support in this circumstance.
Health Insurance
9. Each party should maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner should

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
10.

On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the

petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March
1, 2002.

The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from

said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by
petitioner.

He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party

to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation.
11.

On August 30, 2 002, the Commissioner ruled that his

Order was to be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

He

found the petitioner wrongfully withheld $1,312.50 representing
one-half of the cost of health insurance premiums previously paid
by petitioner for 15 months from the date of separation to the
date of his Order (December 1, 2000, to February 14, 2002) and
ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount of $1,312.50 to the
respondent.
12.

The petitioner has failed to reimburse to the

respondent $1,312.50, representing petitioner's withholding of 1/2

1

of the cost of health insurance premiums paid from December 1,
2000, through February 14, 2002 ($87.50 x 15 months = $1,312.50).
Debts and Obligations
13.
obligations.

The parties have incurred certain debts and
The parties are unable to afford the lifestyle they

have been maintaining and have incurred extensive credit card
debt.
14.

The respondent should be required to pay and hold

petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
15.

The petitioner should be required to pay and hold

the respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First
Credit Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit
Union, and the Firestone account.
16.

Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner

has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.

This Court finds that the majority of the debt was

incurred by the petitioner and that petitioner had the financial
ability to pay the debt and the respondent did not.
Real Property
17.

The petitioner and the respondent have acquired a

residence located at 1422 Vineyard Drive, Bountiful, Utah (the
''Bountiful Residence").

The Bountiful Residence should be awarded

to the petitioner subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent

should cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the
4

petitioner or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest
in the Bountiful Residence.
18.

The petitioner should be permitted to sell the

Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim
or interest therein.

The petitioner should be permitted to retain

any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale
thereof.

Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents

and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed
with the sale and transfer of the Residence.
19.

The respondent should not be responsible for

payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in
August 2 001.
20.

The parties have acquired additional interests in

certain other real property, including but not limited to
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; and
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California,
also known as the Beehive Mine.
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21.

Parcels 1, 13, 15, and 16 are found to be jointly

held by the parties and should be considered joint marital
property.
22.

The Court finds that there is not clear and

convincing evidence of duress associated with plaintiff's transfer
of parcels 8 and 10 to the respondent as a joint tenant.

Parcels

8 and 10 should be considered joint marital property.
23.

The real property and improvements known as Parcel

2 (also known as parcels 22 and 23) located at approximately 10681
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California shall be considered joint
marital property.

There is not sufficient evidence to

conclusively track the funds used to purchase the property and to
establish the lack of commingling that would be required to
establish Parcel 2 (also referred to as Parcels 22 and 23) as the
separate property of the petitioner.
24.

In light of the parties' past payment and debt

history, the above-mentioned California properties should be sold
as soon as possible.
25.

The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to

retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties.
26.

The petitioner should be awarded a right of first

refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California
properties.

Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a

California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice
of the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days
6

from the receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his
election to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona
fide offer.

If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal,

he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from the
sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the
time he exercises his right of first refusal.
27.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (3 0) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.

If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first
refusal.
28.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property.

After

such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
7

October 2002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
29.

The Court finds that the real property and

improvements located at (a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and (b) Blanding, Utah, are the separate, inherited property
of the petitioner.
30.

The petitioner has made no claim in these

proceedings as to any ownership interest in the home in which
respondent is residing in the State of Oklahoma nor to the
respondent's mother's home in Oklahoma.
Personal Property
31.

The parties have acquired certain joint marital

personal property, including household furniture, motor vehicles,
and certain personal property and possessions.
32.

The respondent should be awarded those personal

heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates,
platters, clocks, and lamps.

The court finds that the ski pole in

the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole.
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at
the expense of the petitioner.
33.

The remainder of the personal property should be

awarded to the parties as currently divided.
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34.

The petitioner has received approximately $15,000

more in value of personal property than has the respondent.
35.

The Court finds that the petitioner has paid

$15,000 to the respondent, which shall be considered an offset for
the additional value of personal property received by the
petitioner.
Alimony
36.

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002, through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
37.

The respondent has the ability to earn $8 per hour

and to work 40 hours per week.

The petitioner is not working like

he used to work, but historically has had a greater ability to pay
expenses than the respondent has ability to earn money.
38.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
39.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of
9

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of retirement and survivor benefits set forth
in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
40.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued

I
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
41.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
42.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a
10

reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 41 above.
Life Insurance
'43.

The respondent should be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.

The court finds that such

designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of
the parties.
Attorney's Fees
44.

The Court finds three reasons for awarding attorney

fees in this case.

First, the respondent did not ask for the

divorce and did not want the divorce so she had to hire an
attorney.

Secondly, the Court finds the respondent does not have

the ability to pay.

Thirdly, in light of the rulings previously,

the respondent prevailed in more issues than the petitioner.
45.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2 002, based upon petitioner's
ability to pay a portion of the fees.

The respondent should be

ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein.

The petitioner should be ordered

to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred
herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
46.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver

to the other party any documents required to implement or support
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact.
2. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.
Children of the Parties
3 . The petitioner shall not be obligated to pay child
support to the respondent in regards to Andrew and BreAnna.
Health Insurance
4. Each party should maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner should

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
5. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March
1, 2002.

The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from

said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by
petitioner.

He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party

to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation.
6. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to paragraph 6 above.
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The Court finds

that the check has already been delivered to the respondent as
satisfaction of said obligation.
Debts and Obligations
7. The respondent should be required to pay and hold
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
8. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold the
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union,
and the Firestone account.
9. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.
Real Property
10.

The Bountiful Residence should be awarded to the

petitioner subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent should

cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner
or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest in the
Bountiful Residence.
11.

The petitioner should be permitted to sell the

Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim
or interest therein.

The petitioner should be permitted to retain

any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale
thereof.

Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents
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and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed
with the sale and transfer of the Residence.
12.

The respondent should not be responsible for

payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in
August 2001.
13.

The parties have acquired additional interests in

certain other real property, including but not limited to
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California;
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California,
also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of land located
in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 & 23.
14.

The above-mentioned California properties should be

sold as soon as possible.
15.

The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to

retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties.
16.

The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal

for the purchase of any and all of the California properties.
14

Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer.
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he
exercises his right of first refusal.
17.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.

If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 3 0 days of the time she exercises her right of first
refusal.
18.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property.

After

such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made
15

toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
October 2002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
19.

The real property and improvements located at

(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding,
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner.
Personal Property
20.

The respondent should be awarded those personal

heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates,
platters, clocks, and lamps.

The court finds that the ski pole in

the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole.
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at
the expense of the petitioner.
21.

The remainder of the personal property should be

awarded to the parties as currently divided.
22.

The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall

be considered an offset for the additional value of personal
property received by the petitioner.
Alimony
23.

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount
16

of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002 through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
24.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
25.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set
forth in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
26.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
17

and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
27.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
28.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 27, above.
Life Insurance
29.

The respondent should be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.

The court finds that such

designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of
the parties.
Attorney's Fees
30.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2002.

The respondent should be

ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein.
18

The petitioner should be ordered

to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred
herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
31.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver

to the other party any documents required to implement or support
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY O. BAYLES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No. 004702059 DA
LINDA CARYL BAYLES,
Judge Thomas L. Kay
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002.

The Court, having

reviewed the documents and pleadings on file herein, having heard
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact.
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences
effective October 2, 2002.

*' (VU/VUftDo

Children of the Parties
3. The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna
Rosa Flores Salazar.
Health Insurance
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident,
hospitalization and dental insurance.

The petitioner shall

provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at
the sole cost of the respondent.
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the
insurance check in the amount of $1,63 6.03 in satisfaction of the
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier
recommendation.

The check has already been delivered to the

respondent as satisfaction of said obligation.
Debts and Obligations
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card.
7. The petitioner is required to pay and hold the
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union,
and the Firestone account.
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations
that existed at the time of separation.
2

The petitioner shall not

receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such
payments.
Real Property
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner
subject to the debt thereon.

The respondent shall execute a

quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence.
10.

The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful

Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest
therein.

The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit

or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof.
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the
sale and transfer of the Residence.
11.

The respondent is not responsible for payment of

the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001.
12.

The parties jointly hold certain other real

property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b)
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County,
3

California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22
& 23.
13.

The above-mentioned California properties shall be

sold as soon as possible.
14.

The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain

the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels
through the date of sale of said properties.
15.

The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal

for the purchase of any and all of the California properties.
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days from the
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer.
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he
exercises his right of first refusal.
16.
first refusal.

The respondent is awarded a secondary right of
In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise

his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the
same terms as the bona fide offer.
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If respondent exercises her

right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her right of first
refusal.
17.

At the time of closing on the sale of each

California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees,
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property.

After

such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of
October 2002 through the date of sale.

Any and all remaining

proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally
between the parties.
18.

The real property and improvements located at

(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding,
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner.
Personal Property
19.

The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms

located at the California properties, namely plates, platters,
clocks, and lamps.

The ski pole in the possession of the

petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent
is awarded the ski pole.

Petitioner is permitted to make a model

of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to
5

the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner.
20.

The remainder of the personal property is awarded

to the parties as currently divided.
21.

The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall

be considered an offset for the additional value of personal
property received by the petitioner.
Alimony
22.

The petitioner has made monthly payments to the

respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14,
2002 through the month of October 2002.

These payments shall be

considered temporary alimony.
23.

Commencing with the month of November 2002, the

petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's
retirement.

Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or

upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease.
24.

The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of

petitioner's retirement.

Based upon the current circumstances of

the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony.

At the time of

review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the
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monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued.

Such

review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set
forth in the following section.
Pensions and Retirement Benefits
25.

The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement

funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties.
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in
association therewith.
26.

The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option

to elect either full or partial survivor benefits.

The Court

finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at
this time.

The Court reserves for future determination the issue

of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost.

Such

determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph.
27.

In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to

elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 26, above.
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Life Insurance
28.

The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-

interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance
policy on petitioner's life.
Attorney's Fees
29.

The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's

attorney's fees by December 2, 2002.

The respondent is ordered to

assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees
incurred herein.

The petitioner is ordered to assume and pay his

own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein.
Miscellaneous Provisions
30.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the

other party any documents required to implement or support the
provisions of this Decree.
MADE AND ENTERED this

of November, 2002.

a 38-BaylesW.div decree
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JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 of
PATTERSON, BARKING & LARKIN
Attorney for Respondent
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
Telephone: (801) 394-7704

FILED
° K 8 , 2004
Layton District Court

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

WESLEY O. BAYLES,

ORDER AFTER HEARING

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 004702059DA

LINDA CARYL BAYLES,

Judge: Thomas L. Kay
Commissioner: David L. Dillon

Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on November
10, 2004, before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge,
presiding, for evidentiary and objection hearing from Orders to
Show Cause filed by both parties.

Petitioner was present, and was

represented by his counsel, Michael

D. Murphy; Respondent

was

present, and was represented by her counsel, Judy Dawn Barking.
The Court having heard the evidence of the parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1•
California).

Beehive Mine property

(APN

8,

10, Yuba County ,

Petitioner has indicated his intention to exercise

his right of first refusal for this property. Therefore, he shall
have thirty (30) days from the date of hearing to pay Respondent
Order after hearing
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her share of the purchase price for the property, which shall be
$55,000,00 less Petitioner's actual incurred expenses, divided by
two.
2.

Lake property (10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County,

California).

There is no current offer for the purchase of this

property-

There was no meeting of minds sufficient to establish a

contract for sale at a price of $72,000 between the parties.

The

most recent offer by a third party to purchase the property for
$85,000.00

has been withdrawn.

The Court will not

require

Petitioner to purchase the property for that price when there is
not an outstanding offer.

The property should be placed back on

the market; if Respondent accepts a new bona fide offer for sale of
the property, Respondent or her counsel will notify Petitioner and
his counsel in writing of the offer and Petitioner's thirty-day
right of first refusal will begin to run at that time; if he
exercises his right of first refusal, he will have thirty (30) days
after exercising the right of first refusal to pay Petitioner her
share of the sale price (which shall be the purchase price less
expenses actually incurred by Petitioner, divided by two).

If

Petitioner fails to exercise his right of first refusal to purchase
the property after receipt of such an offer, and fails to cooperate
in closing the sale of the property, he may be held in contempt of
the Court.
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3.
acres).

10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California(five

Based on the agreement of the parties, the property

located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California, should
be sold as soon as possible by closing on the offer which is
currently outstanding,
4.

Unpaid Alimony.

The Court will not find Petitioner

in contempt at this time for his failure to pay alimony.

A

judgment has already been entered against him for unpaid alimony
for the period from June 2003 through June 2004; the Court applies
$13,000.00 of the funds (in the amount of $15,044.26) previously
paid to Respondent to satisfy this judgment.
5.

Respondents claim for additional compensation for

sale of 10695 Forbestown Road.

Respondent was entitled to accept

the funds tendered to her by Petitioner for purchase of this
property, as she was entitled to at least this amount. In essence,
by providing Respondent with a "Seller's Estimated Settlement
Statement"

(Exhibit

3)

reflecting

that

he

had

expenses

of

$66,426.52, Petitioner failed to disclose that he had not actually
incurred all the expenses listed in that document.

That document

is tantamount to an affirmative representation that Petitioner had,
in fact, incurred all those expenses in the amounts shown therein.
The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to deduct any
expenses not actually incurred.

In the case of this property, the
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Court will not concern itself with the numerous small charges on
the statement, but will award Respondent one-half of the real
estate commissions which were not paid by Petitioner, in the amount
of $4,350,00. The Court offsets against this amount the balance of
$2,044.26 previously paid to Respondent by Petitioner, and awards
Respondent the sum of $2,305.74 as remaining compensation for the
sale of Respondent's interest in this property to Petitioner.
6.

Personal

property.

The

Court

will

Respondent in contempt in connection with this issue.
finds

that

the

lawn

tractor was

intended

to be

not

find

The Court
awarded to

Petitioner, and awards him the sum of $2,700.00 for the lawn
tractor, which is the value he claimed for the lawn tractor for
purposes of dividing the personal property at the time of trial.
This amount may be used to offset the amount awarded to Respondent
in paragraph 5, above, leaving a balance of $394.2 6 owing to
Petitioner from Respondent for the lawn tractor.
7.

Attorney' s fees and travel expenses.

The Court

reserves the issues of attorney's fees and travel expenses for
future hearing.
DATED this

^6L day of

Qt&

BY THE COURT:

^JAM^i'
THOMAS L. K M
DISTRICT COURT" JUDGE

, 2004.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH URCP 7(f)
COMES NOW JUDY DAWN BARKING, and certifies to the aboveentitled Court, in accordance with 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, that she did serve a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AFTER HEARING upon Wesley 0. Bayles, Petitioner,
with the understanding that the Respondent herein is to have five
(5) days to object to or to request amendments or changes in said
ORDER AFTER HEARING, and that if the requests are not made within
the five (5) day period, that the ORDER AFTER HEARING shall be
submitted to the Court for its approval and signature. Said ORDER
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was delivered to Michael D. Murphy, Attorney
for Wesley 0. Bayles, Petitioner, by mailing a copy postage prepaid
to his mailing address of P.O. Box 15, Kaysville, Utah 84037, this
day of November, 2004.

^h

JUDY MWN BAR!
A t t o r n e y for Respondent

